Do Elite Athletes Play Optimally Under Pressure? New Research by Heinrich Nax Challenges a Classic Theory
Two new publications test the limits of minimax theory in tennis and basketball
Von Neumann's minimax theorem has long been held up as a benchmark for rational strategic behavior in competitive settings. A growing body of research from sports data has been cited as positive evidence that elite professionals play optimally. We are delighted to share that two new studies co-authored by Heinrich Nax at the Zurich Center for Market Design, published in the journal Games, challenge that consensus. Analyzing serve decisions in professional tennis and shot selection in NBA endgames, the studies find systematic and predictable deviations from minimax precisely when stakes are highest. The findings suggest that pressure, not expertise, may be the decisive factor in breaking strategic optimality. We congratulate Heinrich and his co-authors on these important contributions to behavioral game theory.
Minimax Under Pressure: The Case of Tennis
Decisions in the Basketball Endgame: A Downside of the Three-Point Revolution